worldwidedomination

Krugman: China's Emissions Will Destroy Us All

2009-05-15T05:53:00.000-07:00

Empire of Carbon
By PAUL KRUGMAN

TAIPEI, Taiwan

I have seen the future, and it won’t work.

These should be hopeful times for environmentalists. Junk science no longer rules in Washington. President Obama has spoken forcefully about the need to take action on climate change; the people I talk to are increasingly optimistic that Congress will soon establish a cap-and-trade system that limits emissions of greenhouse gases, with the limits growing steadily tighter over time. And once America acts, we can expect much of the world to follow our lead.

But that still leaves the problem of China, where I have been for most of the last week.

Like every visitor to China, I was awed by the scale of the country’s development. Even the annoying aspects — much of my time was spent viewing the Great Wall of Traffic — are byproducts of the nation’s economic success.

But China cannot continue along its current path because the planet can’t handle the strain.

The scientific consensus on prospects for global warming has become much more pessimistic over the last few years. Indeed, the latest projections from reputable climate scientists border on the apocalyptic. Why? Because the rate at which greenhouse gas emissions are rising is matching or exceeding the worst-case scenarios.

And the growth of emissions from China — already the world’s largest producer of carbon dioxide — is one main reason for this new pessimism.

China’s emissions, which come largely from its coal-burning electricity plants, doubled between 1996 and 2006. That was a much faster pace of growth than in the previous decade. And the trend seems set to continue: In January, China announced that it plans to continue its reliance on coal as its main energy source and that to feed its economic growth it will increase coal production 30 percent by 2015. That’s a decision that, all by itself, will swamp any emission reductions elsewhere.

So what is to be done about the China problem?

Nothing, say the Chinese. Each time I raised the issue during my visit, I was met with outraged declarations that it was unfair to expect China to limit its use of fossil fuels. After all, they declared, the West faced no similar constraints during its development; while China may be the world’s largest source of carbon-dioxide emissions, its per-capita emissions are still far below American levels; and anyway, the great bulk of the global warming that has already happened is due not to China but to the past carbon emissions of today’s wealthy nations.

And they’re right. It is unfair to expect China to live within constraints that we didn’t have to face when our own economy was on its way up. But that unfairness doesn’t change the fact that letting China match the West’s past profligacy would doom the Earth as we know it.

Historical injustice aside, the Chinese also insisted that they should not be held responsible for the greenhouse gases they emit when producing goods for foreign consumers. But they refused to accept the logical implication of this view — that the burden should fall on those foreign consumers instead, that shoppers who buy Chinese products should pay a “carbon tariff” that reflects the emissions associated with those goods’ production. That, said the Chinese, would violate the principles of free trade.

Sorry, but the climate-change consequences of Chinese production have to be taken into account somewhere. And anyway, the problem with China is not so much what it produces as how it produces it. Remember, China now emits more carbon dioxide than the United States, even though its G.D.P. is only about half as large (and the United States, in turn, is an emissions hog compared with Europe or Japan).

The good news is that the very inefficiency of China’s energy use offers huge scope for improvement. Given the right policies, China could continue to grow rapidly without increasing its carbon emissions. But first it has to realize that policy changes are necessary.

There are hints, in statements emanating from China, that the country’s policy makers are starting to realize that their current position is unsustainable. But I suspect that they don’t realize how quickly the whole game is about to change.

As the United States and other advanced countries finally move to confront climate change, they will also be morally empowered to confront those nations that refuse to act. Sooner than most people think, countries that refuse to limit their greenhouse gas emissions will face sanctions, probably in the form of taxes on their exports. They will complain bitterly that this is protectionism, but so what? Globalization doesn’t do much good if the globe itself becomes unlivable.

It’s time to save the planet. And like it or not, China will have to do its part.

More than a coincidence: Minarets, geography and power

2009-05-01T15:47:00.000-07:00

The building of new mosques has become an issue throughout European cities, from Munich to London. In some places, such as Italy, Switzerland and Greece, governments have struggled to prevent their erection. Yet while there is controversy over their very construction, there is usually very little questioning about why they are built where they are built.
A survey of historical placement of mosques in important cities and newly conquered Muslim lands, as well as a survey of the placement of mosques in diverse neighborhoods, shows that their placement is anything but random and that strikingly often they are built next to the houses of prayer or the neighborhoods of non-Muslims.
Across the Middle East and the Muslim world the existence of the minaret is taken for granted. Sometimes square and stout as they are in North Africa, or tall, skinny and cylindrical as they are in Turkey and Eastern Europe, they are the symbol of the Muslim world. Yet their commonness leads people to take them for granted.
According to architecture historian Prof. Keppel A.C. Creswell, the minaret was first developed after the Umayyad dynasty (661-750) came in contact with church towers of the Syrian Orthodox Church. Photos of old Syriac churches show what appears to be a conical tower identical to a minaret. Creswell claimed that "having heard that the Jews used a horn and the Christians a naqus or clapper, [Muslims] wanted something equivalent for their own use."
The Umayyads also were the first to construct mosques atop or next to famous Christian and Jewish holy sites. In Damascus they turned the Church of St. John the Baptist into a mosque between 705 and 715. In 638 when Caliph Omar prayed near, but not in, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, he noted; "If I had prayed in the church it would have been lost to you, for the believers [Muslims] would have taken it saying: Omar prayed here." He was prescient, for the Mosque of Omar was eventually built directly opposite the 13th century entrance to the church. Also in Jerusalem construction was begun on the Aksa Mosque in 690. It was constructed over what had been the Church of Our Lady and before that, the Jewish Temple's storehouse.
Further afield mosques were built atop the giant Hagia Sophia Church in Istanbul (then Constantinople) in the 15th century by the Ottomans and the Babri Mosque at Ayodhya was constructed over the Temple of the Hindu god Ram in the 16th century by the Mughals in India. The Great Mosque of Gaza was built first in the 7th century atop a Byzantine church and then rebuilt in the 13th century atop a Crusader church.
THE MOSQUE and its minaret are symbols of power. The giant brick tower of Qutb Minar in Delhi is 72 meters high and until recent times was the world's tallest minaret. It was constructed by the sultans of Delhi to celebrate their victory and conquest of the city.
Even in more obscure locations, the building of minarets has served as an expression of power and influence. The center of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem has long been the Hurva Synagogue which was constructed and reconstructed several times between 1700 and the present. But attached to this great synagogue is a mosque whose minaret is intentionally taller than the Hurva's dome.
The America Colony Hotel in Sheikh Jarrah has a mosque next door to it. The Western Wall of Jerusalem has a mosque perched atop its northern end. The Mount of Olives Jewish graveyard has a mosque which adjoins it. Jeremiah's Grotto in east Jerusalem, which was for a long time a pilgrimage site, now obscured by the east Jerusalem central bus station, also has a mosque at its entrance. The Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem has a large mosque just across from it on Manger Square, constructed in a town which at the time was 80 percent Christian. A controversy over Muslim attempts to build a mosque next to the Basilica of the Annunciation in Nazareth led to riots in 2002. In each of these cases the mosques were built after the non-Muslim building was constructed.
The building of mosques is not always an expression of power, but historically and today in mixed communities mosques are constructed with a view toward the non-Muslim other. This author is even familiar with a family of Palestinian communists in the West Bank where a mosque was, not coincidentally, constructed next door to their house.
It becomes blatantly obvious in a community like Sheikh Jarrah in east Jerusalem, where almost every other mosque is situated next to a Christian building or former holy site. The next time one sees a mosque, he should not take it for granted. Many of them have a history and geographical placement that is not coincidental and which serves as an expression of political Islam and its aspirations.
The writer, a PhD student in geography at the Hebrew University, runs the Terra Incognita blog. sfrantzman@hotmail.com

Waterboarding - The True Story

2009-04-23T06:09:00.000-07:00

We've all heard a lot about the "torture" of Islamic militants. We might not hear much more about it since President Obama said he would outlaw the practice.
Personally, I think we should stay out of military affairs, as the US, Canada and Australia seem to be the only countries that play by rules created and set up by our enemies. I've often wondered about this torture technique as I have heard it is psychological more than physical. Now I can see first hand what is involved, and I think our enemies should be grateful that *I* am not allowed to obtain information from them for the protection of my family.

So... A Playboy journalist wants to know himself how bad this really is. Click on the link below and see for yourself that at no time is the "enemy" in danger of losing his life or any limbs.

Playboy journalist thinks he can endure 15 seconds of waterboarding

Alaska’s Gull Island Oil Fields Could Power U.S. for 200 Years

2008-07-02T17:09:00.000-07:00

Alaska’s Gull Island Oil Fields Could Power U.S. for 200 Years

By Mark Anderson

“Crude oil is the real ‘currency’ of the world,” said Lindsey Williams at a gathering of the Midwest Concerned Citizens group in Kansas City on July 22. But Americans will never hear about huge oil and gas reserves in the United States, which, if ever tapped, would bring today’s fuel prices at least as low as $1.50 per gallon and make America more energy independent.

As a Baptist missionary in the 1970s, Williams said he rubbed elbows with members of the world’s power elite—who boasted of detailed 30-year and 50-year plans to control the flow of oil and information.

A huge quantity of crude oil and natural gas exists under Gull Island, located in the waters of Prudhoe Bay in Alaska, says Williams. He cited key British Petroleum memoranda and related the statements of upper echelon oil officials who told him that Gull Island would be kept under wraps, limiting domestic supplies so Americans would someday see prices hit up to $10 a gallon at the pump.

“Every issue in the world today relates to crude oil,” said Williams. The U.S. occupation of Iraq and the saber rattling about attacking Iran fit into the crude oil matrix.

Iran is being targeted because it’s one of several countries that want to use their own currencies for oil sales, rather than using the U.S. dollar. Williams told AFP that any country that doesn’t want to “play ball” with the U.S. government and the financial and oil interests is, in essence, put on a hit list.

The United States, he said, learned that Iran intended to form its own bourse and not use the dollar for oil sales. Therefore, the notion that Iran is a menacing “almost-nuclear” country was trumped up, presented as fact via the corporate media and Iran is now in the crosshairs.

Other nations wanting more independence from U.S. meddling include Norway, Venezuela, Nigeria, Bolivia, Sweden and Russia.

The 30-year plan, which was first proposed three decades ago and is nearing fruition, included smug assurances from oil officials that the United States will triple its crude-oil usage and alternative fuels will not be allowed to gain enough ground to make a difference. They also noted that all foreign oil production will be scaled back to the United States and that Americans soon will pay $4 to $5 a gallon at the pump and could pay as much as $7 to $10 down the road.

In the early 1960s crude oil was selected as a tool of world control, Williams said, adding, “What we pay at the gas pump is a form of taxation.” The American consumer’s dependence on crude oil thus far has enabled people from foreign oil-producing nations to buy T-bills (U.S. treasury notes) in order to support the U.S. national debt and continued deficit spending. The need to support that debt puts the U.S. government in a bind, forcing Americans to remain dependent on foreign oil.

Williams, as a chaplain in 1970 when the trans-Alaskan oil pipeline was finished, ministered among the pipeline workers. However, as time passed he made a favorable impression with the top brass and was asked to improve worker-company relations. Next thing he knew, he said he was sitting at meetings of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and various meetings of oil executives over a three-year period.

He told AFP that the IMF-World Bank acts as a middleman between oil producing nations and refineries. In so doing, they set oil prices, he said.

The big event in that three-year period was in 1977 when an Atlantic Richfield oil executive told him, “We have just drilled into the largest pool of oil in North America—[and] in the world!”

That pool was Gull Island. It was said that there was enough natural gas to supply America for 200 years. But to this day, “not one drop” of that oil has been released to American refineries, Williams said.

Williams said the executive had warned him that the Gull Island find was highly classified. Do not repeat any of this, he was told. Obviously, that warning did not stop him.

The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire

2008-06-20T04:50:00.000-07:00

The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire
By Peter Clarke
(Bloomsbury, 559 pages, $35)

The sun did set on the British Empire, after all, roughly 60 years ago, when Britain gave up the Indian Raj and of its Mandate over Palestine. Most histories of this seismic shift in world affairs focus on personalities – no surprise, given the outsize figures of the time: Churchill, Gandhi, Mountbatten, Truman, Weizmann, Ben-Gurion. But even the great are driven forward, in part, by forces larger than themselves.
[Losing Hope, Glory and Assets]

The supreme virtue of Peter Clarke's detailed account of Britain's last imperial days is his effort to describe those forces and register their effect. It is a complicated story – involving economic imperatives, political obstacles and social demands – but Mr. Clarke makes it all clear and captivating. He is maddeningly tendentious: He shows an obvious partiality to Britain, an outright hostility to Zionism, and a not-so-subtle distaste for the U.S. and its postwar rise. But it is not necessary to share Mr. Clarke's prejudices to value "The Last Thousand Days of the British Empire."

Mr. Clarke makes much of Winston Churchill's famous November 1942 vow that he had "not become the King's first minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire." Defeat at the polls in 1945 saved him from the personal ignominy of such a task, but Mr. Clarke argues that the prime minister's decisions, however arguably justified they were, sealed the empire's fate. Mr. Clarke's grand theme is that "Britain's postwar problems were rooted in precisely those wartime commitments that had brought victory. If Churchill was the architect of victory, he was also surely to this extent also the author of Britain's postwar distress."

Mr. Clarke is very hard on Churchill, citing many unflattering comments about him and failing to appreciate his optimism and gallantry in the face of difficult circumstances and the pragmatism that was as essential a part of him as his Tory romanticism. After pithily observing that, by 1947, "the British Empire was now in the hands of the liquidators," Mr. Clarke grotesquely adds: "Churchill's thousand-year Reich had barely outlasted Hitler's."

Still, it is not wrong for Mr. Clarke to assign the blame for imperial collapse to wartime commitments. And money had a great deal to do with it. The war, Mr. Clarke notes, "left India a creditor on a vast scale, with Britain owing it huge sums in the form of the sterling balances." This fact meant that London actually owed New Delhi some £1.3 billion pounds (or $5.2 billion in 1945 dollars). The empire had conferred many benefits on Britain, but by the 1940s its administration and defense were a net drain on London.

And Britain owed a lot to the U.S. as well. Britain's postwar economic weakness became inevitable as soon as it accepted Lend-Lease, the program that allowed Britain to receive from America, during the war, billions of dollars of materiel and supplies. Hailed by Churchill as the "most unsordid act in history" – a phrase calculated to nourish alliances – Lend-Lease in fact exacted from the British draconian sacrifices. Britain transferred across the Atlantic all its dollars and capital assets outside the sterling area; and it sent every scrap of its overseas investments to the U.S. to pay for materiel and other aid, along with cash to the tune of a billion pounds. In 1940, when Britain balked at surrendering nearly everything, Roosevelt summarily dispatched an American warship to Cape Town, South Africa, to collect Britain's remaining gold reserves there.

Europe's gross national product plunged 25% during World War II, Mr. Clarke reminds us, while America's increased 50%. This dramatic shift in relative prosperity provided a solid economic underpinning for the postwar Pax Americana, built on open skies and open seas and the free trade to which empires, with their tariffs and other mercantile policies, are inimical.

By 1946 Britain had no choice but to send its pre-eminent (and dying) economist, John Maynard Keynes, to negotiate a loan from the U.S. to keep Britain afloat. But, as we learn from Mr. Clarke, even this generous act carried seeds of further economic trouble for Britain. A condition of the $5 billion loan was that Britain make sterling fully convertible into dollars. When the premature convertibility came about on July 15, 1947, it was untenable, given the immediate run on the pound, and was abandoned on Aug. 20.

This monetary crisis took place against a background of violence in both the Indian subcontinent, where huge numbers were dying in sectarian killings, and in Palestine, where Jewish terrorists hanged two British sergeants and booby-trapped their bodies to kill those cutting them down. Convertibility ceased five days after partition created the independent states of India and Pakistan, and within weeks Britain handed the fate of Palestine over to the United Nations.

Little wonder. Burdened by its great-power status, which involved the expensive occupation of a large section of northwest Germany with the responsibility to feed Germany's starving population, Britain could not even adequately feed its own people (who faced more draconian rationing in the late 1940s than during the war). Still less could it afford the cost of large troop deployments and the other costs of governing India and Palestine.

The manner in which Britain gave up its responsibilities in these two regions has been the subject of much debate and criticism. It will continue to be. What Mr. Clarke has demonstrated beyond question is that its retreat had long been inevitable, determined by decisions taken earlier in the decade. And who can doubt that Churchill, with his abiding commitment to Anglo-American unity, would have embraced a full Pax Americana no matter what its cost to him and to Britain?

Ronald Reagan's warnings in the 1980s, about the political dangers of Western Europe's dependence on Soviet gas, now seem prescient.

2008-06-19T09:42:00.000-07:00

Petrostate
By Marshall Goldman
(Oxford, 244 pages, $27.95)

Natural gas is a monopolistic business: Building even one pipeline is expensive; building another makes no commercial sense. Russia, with its huge natural-gas reserves, uses its monopoly on east-west pipelines to promote Russia's political interests -- and reacts toughly when challenged. Marshall Goldman sets out these disturbing truths in "Petrostate," a bleak and yet spirited account of Russia's energy politics. The West, Mr. Goldman makes clear, should be wincing at its own vulnerability.
[The Future Is in the Pipeline]

The story, as Mr. Goldman tells it, starts with the first oil boom in the czarist era, when Russia and America together produced 97% of the world's oil. Foreign companies were booted out of the Soviet Union by Lenin and Stalin, only to be invited back in again (on different terms) when their technological expertise was missed. After the fall of communism there was a reverse involvement: Foreigners rushed into Russia to help set up a post-communist economy, only to retreat a few years later.

In between came the era of Soviet go-it-alone energy policy, when oil and gas revenues became the vital prop for Leonid Brezhnev's ailing planned economy. As in so many other parts of the Soviet system, ingenuity battled with incompetence, and incompetence won. The Central Intelligence Agency may have helped matters along by encouraging the Saudis to crash the oil price in the 1980s -- Mr. Goldman suggests as much -- but in the end, he argues, it was the Kremlin's mismanagement of its energy reserves that doomed the Soviet system.

Such incompetence lingers. The greedy and shortsighted engineering practices of the past all but ruined many Russian oil fields: It was routine to pump water in to get oil out, regardless of the consequences. The challenge for current Russian engineers is to coax Russia's shattered geology to cough up more oil -- for example, by drilling horizontally, not vertically. That's a tricky technical challenge. Arguing over the best approach to oil-extraction is at the root of the current row between BP and its Russian partners. The Russians want a dash for cash, while BP is seeking careful, long-term management of the oil fields.

Russia shows more savvy when it comes to selling natural gas abroad, where it has used its pipelines to skewer Europe, striking bilateral deals that might make short-term sense for individual countries but that undermine the leverage and bargaining power of the continent as a whole. Europe is three times bigger than Russia by population and about 10 times bigger in economic terms, yet the eagerness of individual countries for Russia's terms makes Europe politically vulnerable to Moscow's divide-and-prosper strategy. As Russia builds relationships with energy companies that might have been in a position to seek other sources of gas, Europe's ability to diversify its suppliers diminishes -- and becomes a prohibitively costly proposition.

Standing in the nerve center of Gazprom's Moscow headquarters -- staring at a 100-foot wall that electronically displays the spiderweb of natural-gas pipelines spreading across Europe from Russia -- Mr. Goldman marvels: "What an empowering feeling! Should they choose to, those Gazprom functionaries could not only cut off natural gas from the furnaces and stoves of 40 percent of Germany's homes but also the natural gas that many German factories need for manufacturing."

In other words, Ronald Reagan's warnings in the 1980s, about the political dangers of Western Europe's dependence on Soviet gas, now seem prescient. Today Western Europe relies on Russia for half of its natural-gas imports.

It is sometimes argued that Russia's increasing energy consumption and its stagnant production -- its output of natural gas has been virtually flat for the past four years -- will lead to gas shortages in Europe. (They are already biting hard in Russia.) Mr. Goldman dismisses such fears, though much too briefly to be convincing. He also sees no danger of an international natural-gas cartel forming along the lines of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, one that would presumably include Turkmenistan, Venezuela and Trinidad.

Russia would never let its decision-making be affected by others, Mr. Goldman says. That may be true in the case of price-setting (where the economics are quite different from the oil market, because oil is traded on the spot market, whereas the international gas business is mainly based on long-term contracts). But a possible Organization of Gas Exporting Countries could still help bolster Russia's position by consolidating producer power in exploration, pipeline routes and the market for liquefied natural gas.

The biggest hole in "Petrostate" is its skimpy treatment of the European Union. An important question facing the EU now, for instance, is whether its energy liberalization policy -- unbundling the wholesale and retail businesses in gas and electricity -- will help or hinder the Kremlin. A fragmented market may be even easier to manipulate. Mr. Goldman's sharp mind would be well-suited to untangling such intricacies.

The unanswerable question is whether the Kremlin -- or more precisely, Vladimir Putin -- will use gas as a weapon to gain international political influence. The optimistic view is that business normalizes politics -- in this case, that Russia's need to be a dependable partner will require it to soften its political edge and conform to international standards of behavior. Pessimists fear that gas dependency will lead to the Finlandization of Europe. On the evidence so far, the pessimists have the better chance of being right.

Iran Moves Into Central Africa

2008-04-25T16:57:00.000-07:00

While we're sleeping, the Iranian octopus is extending it's tentacles into yet another strategic arena, this time in central Africa.

As I've noted previously, this is not the first time Iran has sought to extend its reach into Africa,using its Hezbollah proxy as a wedge. The Islamic Courts in Somalia are received assistance from Iran and Hezbollah, and Somali fighters from the Islamic Courts fought with Hezbollah against Israel in the last Lebanon War. This was part of a strategic jihad aimed at finishing off the resistance in Darfur, surrounding and marginalizing Christian Ethiopia and moving down into East Africa, where there are already substantial Islamist movements in Kenya and Tanzania.

That plan was unexpectedly held up by the courageous efforts of the Ethiopian forces and their allies, who routed the Islamist forces and fought the jihadis to a standstill in Somalia.

The new push by Iran involves a close strategic and military relationship with the jihadist regime of Omar al-Bashir in the Sudan, and an attempt to take over the neighboring country of Chad...and its oil and uranium.

Not counting the Janjiweed militias, the Sudan has a standing army of 120,000, mostly equipped with second rate Russian and Chinese arms. Because of the publicity surrounding the Darfur genocide,the Sudanese regime's backing for the Islamist insurgents trying to overthrow the regime of Chad's president Idriss Déby and China's concern over its public image with the Olympic Games coming up in August, these traditional suppliers have backed away from supplying the Sudanese army with the tools of the trade. And Iran has stepped into the vacuum.

Sudan and Iran have now concluded a comprehensive military agreement for Iran to supply arms and training for the Sudan's army, in a pact signed in Khartoum March 8th by Iranian defense minister Mustafa Mohammed Majjar and Sudanese defense minister General Abdul-rahim Hussein.

The pact involves what amounts to a mutual defense agreement, with each country agreeing to come to the other's aid in the event of foreign aggression, and the two countries agreeing to establish a joint military commission to coordinate strategy.

There's also training for the Sudanese Army ( most likely by the Republican Guard) and a massive package of Iranian-made arms, which are a natural fit for the Sudanese army since the Iranian arms are mostly knock-offs of Russian technology...and in any event, it's a simple matter for the Russians to ship arms to the Sudanese using Iran as a convenient go-between. Iran has also pledged to build factories in the Sudan to manufacture Iranian arms.

What does Iran get out of it? Plenty.

They get a base strategically located in Africa in a Muslim ruled nation, with a long seacoast on the Red Sea along a major sea route to the Persian Gulf and within spitting distance ( or should I say, missile range) of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. They get a guaranteed market for their arms and access to Sudan's oil, and remember that Iran's oil production is actually decreasing by about 7% per year.

And they can work directly with the Sudanese to destabilize Chad, and possibly get control of Chad's oil and uranium, something the mullahs find very interesting for obvious reasons. Chad's uranium deposits are in the eastern part of the country, right on the Sudan's borders. That's also the part of the country most heavily dominated by Muslims. And interestingly enough, the Sudan-backed insurgency fighting to overthrow the government of President Déby is centered in the same part of the country.

The rebels were strong enough to actually bring the fighting to Ndjamena, the capitol early this year before the French intervened and sent troops in to bolster the Déby regime, and at present there are 2,200 EU troops, more than half from former colonial power France deployed in Eastern Chad. But under the terms of their mission, they'll be leaving in a year.

Once they're gone, will the Iran/Sudan axis step up its efforts to oust Déby and take over Chad, or put together an insurgent 'government' in the Eastern part of the country?

Time will tell, but I think that's the sort of strategic thinking being done inTehran right now.